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Abstract—Traffic monitoring is essential for network manage-
ment tasks that ensure security and QoS. However, the contin-
uous increase of HTTPS traffic undermines the effectiveness of
current service-level monitoring that can only rely on unreliable
parameters from the TLS handshake (X.509 certificate, SNI) or
must decrypt the traffic. We propose a new machine learning-
based method to identify HTTPS services without decryption.
By extracting statistical features on TLS handshake packets and
on a small number of application data packets, we can identify
HTTPS services very early in the session. Extensive experiments
performed over a significant and open dataset show that our
method offers a good accuracy and a prototype implementation
confirms that the early identification of HTTPS services is
satisfied.
Index Terms—Monitoring, HTTPS, TLS/SSL, Firewall, C4.5
I. INTRODUCTION
EARLY identification of Internet traffic is vital for networkoperators. They need to know what is passing through
their network as early as possible thanks to their monitoring
infrastructure, so that they can take the proper actions to
manage the network, as for example for security, QoS or
traffic engineering purposes. Indeed, observing relevant events
to these tasks has to be done as soon as possible to avoid any
security breach, malfunction or downtime. Therefore, network
monitoring and analysis tools must be continuously adapted to
pursue the quick evolution of the network traffic and to cope
with modern challenges.
In particular, today’s network monitoring solutions are los-
ing their power due to the global trend toward encryption
of network communications. Encryption undermines the ef-
fectiveness of standard monitoring approaches and makes it
difficult to identify and monitor the services behind encrypted
traffic, which is essential to properly manage the network. On
the web, Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the most widely
used encryption protocol. The HTTPS protocol allows web
applications to secure HTTP over TLS, which makes it difficult
for a third party to infer information about users’ interaction
with a website using packets sniffer or Man-in-the-Middle
attacks [1].
The trend of using HTTPS protocol has created an ”En-
cryption Rush” on Internet industry in two dimensions: the
size of HTTPS traffic, and the number of HTTPS websites.
According to Cisco 2018 annual security report [2] 50% of
global web traffic was encrypted as of October 2017. That
is a 12-point increase in volume from November 2016. Also
the augmentation of HTTPS traffic is recorded by Mozilla
telemetry, where it shows that the HTTPS traffic has reached
a tipping point and passed the halfway mark of the total size
of web traffic [3].
But HTTPS is a double edged sword. On one side, the
increasing share of the HTTPS traffic has been a mostly
positive step toward more security and privacy on the web.
On the other side, HTTPS does not prevent malicious websites
despite the check of SSL certificates [4]. The authors in [5]
found that 13% of Chinese websites are using self-signed SSL
certificates instead of one issued and verified by a Certificate
Authority (CA). Even worse, based on [6], there is a significant
number of phishing websites that use valid SSL certificates
issued by trusted CAs to convince clients to trust them.
Therefore, there is a high demand for solutions able to monitor
HTTPS traffic. Three practical methods are used to early
identify HTTPS services, namely: Server Name Indication
(SNI), SSL certificate and HTTPS proxy. In our previous
work [7] the reliability issues of the first two approaches were
explained. Concerning the HTTPS proxy, it decrypts HTTPS
traffic between a client and server at the cost of huge trust and
privacy issues and can only be used in very sensitive contexts.
Hereby, we present a new approach to identify HTTPS
services very early without any decryption and without relying
on simple protocol headers’ values but instead on the traffic
pattern itself learned from the first few packets. Early identi-
fication means are at the core of middle-boxes like Network
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) to identify and manage
services, for example to prevent access to unsafe websites.
Also, it can be used to apply QoS by triggering automated
re-allocation of network resources for high priority services
such as webmail [8].
The contribution of this paper is fourfold: (1) a novel
processing of the TLS handshake and few application data
packets to identify services in HTTPS traffic very early in the
session. (2) a comprehensive HTTPS identification framework,
that is able to monitor HTTPS services without decryption. (3)
the evaluation of the efficiency of our solution over an open
HTTPS dataset. (4) a prototype software that demonstrates the
early identification and practical applicability of the proposed
approach. While our previous work [9] was focused on the
definition of the statistical features and of the multi-level
identification approach, this works extends and refines our
initial contribution to make it work with only a few packets
instead of the full flow, what widens its applicability.
2The rest of the text is organized as follows: Section II
explores related work on HTTPS identification. Our method-
ology is presented in Section III. Section IV evaluates the
proposed approach, features, algorithm and the used dataset.
Section V presents our proof-of-concept prototype, it also
discusses the prototype performance for identifying HTTPS
service. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Identifying network traffic on the fly with machine learning
has two main challenges before even discussing the statistical
features and the method to use: reassembling flows and
gathering a sufficient number of packets needed to classify
a flow. In this section, we explore the literature work that
discusses these issues.
Flows reassembly: a TCP flow is defined as a set of packets
that have the same 4-tuples (source IP address, source port,
destination IP address and destination port) [10]. The HTTPS
flow contains three types of packets: Handshake packets,
Application data packets and pure TCP control packets. The
idea of flow demultiplexing is to build a table (e.g., Hash
table), where each record contains the packets from a single
TCP flow and is accessed by the key of the flow (i.e., the
4-tuple). For each new incoming packet, the 4-tuple key
is computed and used for searching in a table to find the
corresponding flow of the packet.
Xiong et al. [10] propose a TCP flow reassembly approach
for real-time network traffic processing in high-speed net-
works. They used the Recently Accessed First principle to
reduce the search cost of the related flow of incoming packets,
by bringing the most recently accessed flow record on top
of the table, so the next following packets will be mapped
quickly. In [11] the authors also apply the same method for
flow reassembly: they run packet capture, flow reassembly, and
classification with machine learning modules in a pipeline way.
Their method achieves a reassembly throughput of 24,997.25
flows/second, while the average delivery delay is 0.49 seconds.
Groleat et al. [12] also share the idea of building a real-time
classifier based on SVM algorithm. They tried to detect the
categories of network applications, while we aim to be more
precise to identify flows at service-level. In their work, they
proposed a high-speed flow reassembly algorithm able to han-
dle one million concurrent flows by using massive parallelism
and low-level network interface access of Field-Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) boards. Their results show up to 20 GB/s
for flow reassembly. In our work, we benefit from the approach
in [10] to optimize the HTTPS flow reassembly module.
The flow reassembly using hardware facility like FPGA is
promising, but we keep it for our future work.
Sufficient Number of Packets: the sufficient number of
packets is a critical parameter, since packets are required to
obtain statistics about the flows that are used as input for
identification methods. Many research works have investigated
how many packets are actually needed to obtain sufficient
statistics to keep high accuracy levels. Bernaille et al. [13]
report using the first 4 packets to early identify applications
over TLS traffic like FTP, SMPT or POP3. Kumano et al.
[14] investigate the real-time identification of applications type
(e.g., P2P, Streaming, etc.) in encrypted traffic. Their results
show that they need 70 packets for their real-time identifica-
tion. Maolini et al. [15] handle the problem of identifying
SSH traffic and the underlying protocols (SCP, SFTP and
HTTP). Their results show that the first 3 to 7 packets with
a K-means clustering algorithm are sufficient to achieve a
real-time identification. In [16] the authors use the first 100
packets for on the fly classification between applications like
SMTP, POP3, eDonkey and BitTorrent. They have combined
K-means and K-nearest neighbour clustering algorithms to
build a lightweight classifier.
Based on the aforementioned studies, we can see that
values range from 3 to 100 packets. In our case, we can not
clearly deduce from this state-of-the-art the sufficient number
of packets we need, since we have a more precise target
(i.e., service-level identification), which is more challenging
than the application-level identification of the aforementioned
studies that consider HTTPS traffic as one class. Therefore,
we have to evaluate carefully the sufficient number of packets
that makes it possible to early recognize HTTPS services.
Early Identification of Network Flows: intuitively, offline
identification methods should give better results since they
depend on stable and complete flows’ statistics. In offline
approaches, the identification process starts after network
flows have been terminated and only then statistical features
are computed regardless of time and computation complexity.
However, the problem is harder in the context of early iden-
tification, where the identification runs in parallel with flows
and the goal is to name the HTTPS service behind a live flow
as soon as possible, by using as little information as possible
without sacrificing accuracy.
Many efforts have been made to use machine learning
techniques and to make them efficient for early identification.
The authors in [11], [14], [16]–[18] apply different machine
learning approaches (C4.5, REPTree, K-means, SVM, Naive
Bayes) for identifying the application type (e.g., P2P, SSH,
BitTorrent) of encrypted traffic in real-time manner with
acceptable level of accuracy and overhead. We are going much
further into the identification granularity by early identifying
specific HTTPS services.
III. EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF HTTPS SERVICES
The proposed framework contains two phases: the first
phase includes offline learning and model building and the
second phase concerns real-time flow reassembly and features
extraction. For the early identification, we use TLS handshake
packets and only the first application data packets. The reasons
behind this choice are: First, to minimize the overhead of
the flow reassembly step, as it should reassemble only a few
packets. In the rest of this paper, we mean by flow reassembly
the gathering of the TLS handshake packets and a small
number of application data packets. Second, to decrease the
effect of out-of-order packets, which is a challenge in early
identification systems [19]. We benefit from the fact that the
TLS handshake messages must arrive in-order to establish the
TLS connection. Third, to limit the sensibility of the signa-
ture to services’ evolution. The continuous evolution of web
3TABLE I: Our 36 statistical features over TLS handshake and
application data packets
Common features (9 features per direction)
Packet size (Average, 25th, 50th, 75th Percentile, Variance, Maximum)
Inter arrival time (25th,50th,75th Percentile)
TLS handshake header features (6 features)
ClientHello packet
(length of Session ID, number of cipher suites, length of extensions list)
ServerHello packet
(length of Session ID, used cipher suite, length of extension list)
Application data packets features (6 features per direction)
Packet size (Average, 25th, 50th, 75th Percentile, Variance, Maximum)
applications creates an overhead to machine learning based
identification methods that must re-evaluate their statistical
features periodically to cope with changes. Thus, using TLS
handshake messages and only few application data packets
should reduce the effect of traffic characteristics changes in
time, since handshake messages are only used to establish
TLS connections. To our knowledge, it is the first time that
TLS handshake and few application data packets are used to
identify HTTPS services.
Formally, the identification of HTTPS services can be
described as follows. Let us assume X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} a
set of HTTPS flows. A flow instance xi contains h TLS
handshake packets, and d application data packets. A flow
xi is characterized by a vector of r features (e.g., packets
mean size). Also let Y = {y1, y2, ..., ys} be the set of known
HTTPS services, where s is the total number of known HTTPS
services. The yi is the HTTPS service behind an HTTPS flow
xi . Thus, our target is to learn the mapping of a r− dimensional
variable X to Y .
A. The statistical features
Identifying HTTPS services on the fly requires to limit
the choice of features to those that can be computed quickly
on partial flows. In addition, a threshold must be determined
that is the sufficient number of packets that must have been
captured from a flow to start the extraction of features and
perform the identification [16]. The proper threshold value will
be discussed and evaluated later.
According to our public HTTPS dataset (presented in Sec-
tion IV), the number of handshake packets is not fixed among
TLS sessions, since the TLS handshake can take three or four
packets, or even more depending on whether a client and a
server start a new fresh handshake or resume a previous one.
Therefore, we use the start of exchanging application data
packets as the indicator of the handshake phase completion.
Then, we further consider the first application data packets.
Hence, a set of statistical features that contains three group
of features has been defined; the first group is common to all
packets (i.e., TLS handshake and application data packets), the
second one is related to the TLS handshake headers , while
the third group is related to application data packets. Table I
summarized the 36 features we have selected for identifying
HTTPS services in real-time. Some of these features were
evaluated in our previous work [9].
B. Selected machine learning algorithm
Once the features are computed, they are used as input
for a machine learning algorithm. Many machine learning
algorithms have been already used for encrypted traffic clas-
sification, such as C4.5, Naı¨ve Bayes, SVM, etc. All machine
learning algorithms identify traffic by using features as input
of their classification method. There is no best classification
model for all applications but some may perform better than
others in our case. For instance, according to [20], if we want
to differentiate traffic generated by multiple protocols, the C4.5
algorithm would be better than SVM algorithm, but if we
target a small number of network applications, the SVM would
be more suitable.
In the field of encrypted traffic classification some machine
learning algorithms have been used extensively. The authors
in [21] used Naı¨ve Bayesian, RIPPER and C4.5 for detecting
SSH and Skype traffic. McCarthy et al. [22] used C4.5,
RIPPER, and Naı¨ve Bayes techniques to detect TLS traffic,
while Li et al. apply the RandomForest algorithm [23]. In
[24] the authors find that C4.5 and Naı¨ve Bayes provide a good
accuracy in the context of a near real-time identification of net-
work traffic. In this work, we only consider the C4.5 algorithm.
The main reason is based on the performance comparison
between different machine learning algorithms conducted in
[25] for a similar use case and where the results show that
the C4.5 algorithm is very fast and efficient, what becomes
particularly important in the context of early identification. It
also has a low computational overhead, simple to implement
and it requires less learning time and classification time [17].
C. Architecture
Figure 1 illustrates the phases of the proposed approach.
First, we run the offline part to build the classification model,
which will be used in the early identification phase for identi-
fying HTTPS services. The offline phase has been detailed
extensively in our previous work [9]. The early identifica-
tion phase consists in the flow reassembly process and the
identification engine. The core of the identification engine is
prepared in the offline phase. The flow reassembly module
demultiplexes the TLS handshake and application data packets
into the corresponding flow. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions
of the proposed approach in the early identification phase as
follows: (1) The reassembly module receives TLS packets
from the Network Interface Card (NIC) and demultiplexes
incoming packets, (2) When the number of packets in a flow
reaches a given threshold, the feature extraction over the flow
packets is triggered, (3) Computed features are given to the
pre-built classification model for identification and (4) Finally,
the predicted HTTPS service name is given.
IV. EVALUATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section evaluates the key parameters that may affect
the accuracy of the proposed solution: the HTTPS dataset
and the threshold value that defines the sufficient number
of packets needed to early identify HTTPS services with a
good accuracy. For the evaluation, we use the features set
described in Section III-A with the C4.5 machine learning
4Fig. 1: Framework architecture for early identification of HTTPS services
algorithm. Except if explicitly mentioned, we use the 10-fold
cross validation (i.e, 90% of data for training and 10% for
testing). Our main evaluation metric is the Accuracy defined
as: the percentage of correctly classified instances over the
total number of instances [25].
A. Public HTTPS dataset
We built our own dataset due to the the lack of available
HTTPS traces dataset including packet’s payload. Thanks to
an automated script, we visited the top 1000 HTTPS websites
referenced in the Internet-Wide Scan Data Repository1 on a
daily basis during two weeks, using both Google Chrome and
Firefox web browsers. Our script loads the main page of each
website, which is sufficient to get the beginning of the flows
and does not create privacy issues when releasing the dataset,
since no real users generated the traffic.
The dataset we made contains 487312 flows related to 7977
different HTTPS services for a total size of 55 GB. This
higher number of services is due to many HTTPS flows being
from third-party content providers that are used to render
the requested web pages: load the website content, display
advertisement, make statistics, etc. The collection process took
place over two weeks. Therefore, we consider only the HTTPS
services that appeared at least 14 times (one per day) in our
traces and are included in the original target list. It means, for
each HTTPS service, a minimum number of 14 labelled flows
per service is needed to train the classification model. The
dataset has been pre-processed by eliminating uncompleted
flows with no application data packets. We indeed need to be
sure that we use valid flows to train our model.
The dataset is divided in two parts according to the web
browser used to access the websites. Some flows were issued
by Google Chrome (70771 labelled flows related to 1384
HTTPS services), and the others by Firefox (56116 labelled
flows related to 890 HTTPS services). Therefore, we evalu-
ate our approach over HTTPS services accessed by Google
Chrome and Firefox to be sure that the classification results
are not sensitive to the client but just to the accessed service.
For the sake of reproducibility, our HTTPS dataset is pub-
licly available 2 with full encrypted payloads and the TLS layer
1https://scans.io/series/443-https-tls-alexa
2http://betternet.lhs.loria.fr/datasets/https/
information. We hope to contribute in solving the absence of
reference datasets for HTTPS [26].
Overview of the HTTPS dataset
As explained before, our approach relies on features cal-
culated over the TLS handshake packets and over application
data packets. This section explores the number of TLS hand-
shake packets and of application data packets present in the
different flows that constitute our HTTPS dataset. Figure 2
depicts that the number of TLS handshake packets is between
3 and 5 packets. We can notice close yet different distributions
between Google Chrome and Firefox but the majority of flows
have 4 TLS handshake packets, 75% for Google Chrome and
66% for Firefox. Regarding application data packets, Figure 3
shows the distribution of flows according to the total number
of application data packets they have. There are many short
HTTPS flows with only one or two application data packets
(49% for Google Chrome, 53% for Firefox), while a relatively
small number of flows are long with more than 9 application
data packets (18% for Google Chrome, 18% for Firefox),
even if they represent more in terms of the proportion of data
exchanged.
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Fig. 2: Distribution of the number of TLS handshake packets
per flow in the dataset
Figure 4 depicts the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the number of application data packets per flow.
A significant proportion of flows (49%) consists of one or
two application data packets, while flows with 9 or more
application data packets account for about 18%. From another
point of view, Table II, shows the contribution of the different
flows regarding their number of application data packets to
51 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 > 9
0
0.2
0.4
Number of application data packets
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
tr
af
fi
c
si
ze Google Chrome
Firefox
Fig. 3: Distribution of the number of application data packets
per flow in the dataset
TABLE II: The participation in the dataset size per flow size
Application
Data Packets
Google Chrome FireFox
1 15% 14%
2 19% 16%
3 8% 7%
4 7% 7%
5 5% 5%
6 5% 6%
7 4% 4%
8 4% 6%
>9 34% 35%
the total size of the dataset. The flows with one application
data packet account for 15.3% of the total traffic size with
Google Chrome, and 14.13% with Firefox. It can be noticed
that short flows (i.e., with less than 9 application data packets)
account for almost two thirds of the total size (≃ 64%) while
long flows account for a bit more than the last third (≃ 35%)).
This can be explained by the specific nature of web traffic that
vehiculates a lot of small objects like CSS files, HTML titles,
JavaScript, etc. So these short TCP flows are almost related
to simple HTTP GET and POST requests used to get the
web pages’ content [27]. These statistics reflects the way the
dataset was generated (i.e. by loading the front page of each
website) and may not be representative of HTTPS traffic at a
larger scale which may hold other kinds of traffic, for example
large sessions of video streaming over HTTPS. Anyway, our
goal being to identify services by using very few packets, the
dataset is perfectly adapted to our objective.
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Fig. 4: CDF for the number of application data packets per
flow
B. Evaluation of the number of application data packets
characterizing a flow
As shown in the previous section, the majority of flows have
3 to 4 TLS handshake packets, however there is a large variety
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Fig. 5: Impact of the number of application data packets
considered on the identification accuracy, when identifying
long flows (> 15 data packets per flow)
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Fig. 6: Impact of the number of application data packets
considered on the identification accuracy when identifying
all flows
in the number of application data packets per flow. Hence,
our objective is to use the minimum number of application
data packets that enables an accurate early identification of
HTTPS services. So we evaluate in this section the correlation
between the accuracy and the number of application data
packets considered.
First, long HTTPS flows (> 15 data packets) are handled.
The target is to assess the accuracy to identify HTTPS services
behind such long flows using different d numbers of applica-
tion data packets, where d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 15}. Hence,
10 classification models were built. Each model was created
using all the TLS handshake packets and d application data
packets. For example, the first model consists in considering
only the TLS handshake packets (d = 0) to build the model
and identify HTTPS services, while the second model includes
TLS handshake packets plus one data packet (d = 1).
In the dataset, we find 171 different HTTPS services ac-
cessed with Google Chrome and 124 HTTPS services accessed
with Firefox having more than 15 application data packets.
Figure 5 shows the relation between the number of applica-
tion data packets considered by the model and the overall
identification accuracy. As expected, increasing the number
of application data packets improves the accuracy. However,
after 9 application data packets the identification accuracy is
almost stable, for Google Chrome we get 91.66%± 0.57, and
for Firefox 96.33% ± 0.47. Thus, it is possible to identify
HTTPS services behind long flows quite early by using only
the first 9 application data packets and without decreasing the
6However, as shown in Figure 3, most flows of the dataset
are short (82% of flows have less than 9 application data
packets).Thus, a classification model should be able to handle
various number of application data packets to be able to
identify all flows. Figure 6 depicts the performance of C4.5
models that have been built by progressively increasing the
maximum number of application data packets considered when
building/training the model and applied to identify all HTTPS
services considered in the dataset (1384 of Google Chrome and
890 of Firefox) irrespectively of the flow size. For instance, if
we use up to three application data packets, HTTPS flows with
one, two or three data packets are fully given for training and
testing, while longer flows are limited to the three first appli-
cation data packets. It can be noticed that with no application
data packets (only handshake packets), the classification of
Google Chrome and Firefox traffic achieves 79.9% and 77.4%
identification accuracy respectively. However, the accuracy can
be increased to 90.25% and 90.2% if a single application data
packet is added. If we include up to 4 application data packets,
the accuracy rises respectively to 91.27% and 91.5%.
Decoupling the number of application packets used in training
phase from testing phase
A deeper analysis is conducted to assess the performance of
the proposed method by measuring the identification accuracy
with less or more application data packets when trying to
identify a service than the number used for training.
Varying the number of application data packets is valid
from the ML-algorithm point of view because we use flow-
level features and not packet-level features. So, the space used
to perform the classification is the same and the number of
features used does not vary with the number of application
packets. For example, computing the maximum packet-size of
a flow over 3 or 5 packets only counts as a single feature. But
the measured value of the feature may change regarding the
number of input packets used for its computation.
Let’s assume, we train a classification model to identify a
given HTTPS service X using 4 handshake packets plus up
to d application data packets. This means that features related
to application data packets (see Table I), will be computed
over d or less application data packets. However, we deal
with application data packets, which number is not fixed and
varies according to the amount of data to be exchanged. So if
the model is given features from a flow X computed over 4
handshake packets but with r application data packets, where
r , d, we need to assess how much the accuracy of the model
will be affected. The motivation is to explore what is the best
number of packets d to consider when building the model
and how another identification threshold (fewer or higher) can
affect (or not) the accuracy.
In this part, our approach is still validated using flows
accessed by Google Chrome and Firefox. Table III shows
the accuracy using a C4.5 model with up to d application
packets, where d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9} to identify HTTPS
services accessed by Google Chrome, and Table IV for the
ones accessed by Firefox. Typically, the interesting result is
to see how a short training threshold affects the identification
accuracy of long flows and how a high threshold affects the
identification of short flows, in order to find a good trade-off.
Please note that 10-fold cross validation was not used for this
experiment to limit the noise. Consequently, when training and
testing thresholds are aligned, the accuracy is always of 100%
since we train and test on the same flows (i.e. all flows are
used for training, no flows are kept for testing). But this result
is not interesting and has been removed from the tables. It is
also redundant with the experiment leading to Figure 6 that
used 10-fold cross validation and aligned training thresholds.
In the first row in Table III, we build a C4.5 classification
model by calculating the statistical features over the TLS
handshake packets plus a single application data packet. Then
this model is tested to identify flows by looking at different
numbers of application data packets. The idea is to assess
the identification accuracy by using only one application data
packet for training. For instance the second column (in the
first row) shows an accuracy of 96% for identifying flows
by looking at their first two application data packets. The
last column (still in the first row) gives the identification
accuracy 90% for identifying flows with up to 9 application
data packets, with the same training configuration. This table
shows that with a low training threshold the accuracy decreases
when the testing threshold increases, but with a high training
threshold, accuracy decreases even faster when the testing
threshold lowers.
According to these results (for both Google Chrome and
Firefox), there is a trade-off between the number of allowed
application data packets and the level of identification accu-
racy. Thus, we conclude that using a training model that has
been built using up to 4 or 5 application data packets offers
more balanced results to identify both short and long HTTPS
flows. As shown in Table III and Table IV using up to 5
application data packets achieves (75%, 73%) identification
accuracy with HTTPS flow with a single application data
packet and (94%, 96%) to identify ones with 9 application
data packets for Google Chrome and Firefox respectively.
C. Classification model generalized for multiple clients
In the above sections, we considered different classification
models for each web browser separately; one model for
services accessed by Google Chrome and another one for
services accessed by Firefox. However, for building a general
classification model, we want to know if the browser used to
train the model affects its validity for other sources of traffic.
In theory, it should not because the features are designed to
identify the service.
The authors in [28] studied the effect of using different
operating systems (Windows, Linux, Mac) and different web
browsers (Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Firefox) on the
identification of some HTTPS services. Their results show that
there is a strong relation between the client side environment
(i.e., OS and Web browser) and the identification of the service
of a given HTTPS flow (offline analysis). In our experiments,
we use Ubuntu as operating system and, as mentioned earlier,
Google Chrome and Firefox web browsers. Thus, the questions
arises as to whether it is possible to train a classification model
using HTTPS flows from Google Chrome to identify HTTPS
flows from Firefox or vice-versa?
7TABLE III: Identifying HTTPS services accessed by Google Chrome
Testing (up to d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T
ra
in
in
g
(u
p
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d
)
1 - 96% 94% 91% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
2 83% - 95% 90% 89% 90% 89% 88% 87%
3 80% 95% - 95% 94% 93% 92% 92% 91%
4 72% 92% 96% - 98% 97% 96% 94% 93%
5 75% 89% 94% 97% - 98% 97% 95% 94%
6 73% 88% 92% 96% 98% - 99% 97% 96%
7 74% 88% 92% 95% 97% 99% - 98% 97%
8 73% 88% 92% 95% 96% 98% 99% - 99%
9 71% 86% 93% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99% -
TABLE IV: Identifying HTTPS services accessed by Firefox
Testing (up to d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T
ra
in
in
g
(u
p
to
d
)
1 - 84% 79% 77% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76%
2 83% - 91% 84% 81% 80% 79% 78% 78%
3 76% 93% - 96% 95% 93% 92% 91% 90%
4 73% 88% 96% - 98% 96% 95% 94% 93%
5 73% 88% 94% 97% - 98% 97% 96% 96%
6 70% 85% 91% 96% 98% - 99% 98% 98%
7 72% 85% 90% 94% 97% 99% - 99% 99%
8 73% 86% 90% 93% 96% 98% 99% - 100%
9 74% 86% 90% 93% 98% 98% 99% 100% -
TABLE V: Identification accuracy of a generic classification model
trained with both Google Chrome and Firefox flows
Testing (up to d) application data packets#App. for
Training
Web
Browser 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Chrome - 97% 95% 90% 89% 89% 88% 88% 88%
up to 1
Firefox - 93% 88% 86% 84% 84% 84% 83% 83%
Chrome 82% - 95% 93% 92% 92% 92% 91% 91%
up to 2
Firefox 80% - 94% 92% 91% 90% 89% 89% 89%
Chrome 77% 93% - 97% 95% 94% 93% 92% 91%
up to 3
Firefox 69% 90% - 96% 94% 93% 91% 90% 89%
Chrome 73% 90% 95% - 97% 97% 95% 93% 93%
up to 4
Firefox 69% 87% 95% - 97% 95% 93% 92% 91%
Chrome 72% 87% 91% 97% - 98% 97% 95% 95%
up to 5
Firefox 68% 86% 92% 96% - 98% 95% 95% 95%
The experimental results show that, if we use Firefox’s
HTTPS flows for training the model and Google Chrome’s
HTTPS flows for testing, the identification accuracy is low
(19%) and this result is inline with [28]. One possible reason
of this low accuracy is that each browser uses a different
implementation of TLS library: Mozilla uses Network Security
Services (NSS) libraries to provide the support for TLS in
Firefox web browser and other services [29], while Google has
developed its own fork of OpenSSL, named BoringSSL [30].
Using different implementation of the TLS protocol affects the
collected features over different clients. This first observation
tends to show that we need several separate models for
identifying HTTPS services depending on the client. However,
this approach complicates the early identification of HTTPS
services, since we don’t always have a prior knowledge about
the used web browser. As a result, to provide a general
classification model that is able to deal with HTTPS flows
regardless the web browser, we have combined both Google
Chrome and Firefox traces for training to generate a single and
more generic model. For testing, we use this general model to
assess if it can identify HTTPS services accessed from either
Google Chrome or Firefox.
Table V shows the identification accuracy of using one
general model trained with both Google Chrome and Firefox
flows. For testing, we use flows from each web browser
separately. We observe that the behaviour of the general
classification model is similar to the dedicated ones. It means,
with a low training threshold the accuracy decreases when
testing threshold increases, but with a high training threshold,
accuracy decreases even faster when the testing threshold
lowers. So we have decided to consider using a training
threshold of 5 application data packets to build a general
model. Figures 7a, 7b compare the performance of the general
model to identify HTTPS services accessed by Google Chrome
and Firefox against a the dedicated models per web browser.
We notice that the overall identification does not change
significantly by using the general model. Based on these
results, we conclude that it is possible to benefit from using
one general model to early identify HTTPS services regardless
of the web browser used to access a given service if the
training dataset already represents clients’ diversity.
V. A PROTOTYPE FOR EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF
SERVICES IN HTTPS TRAFFIC
As a direct application of the previous results, we have
developed a prototype that is able to recognize HTTPS services
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Fig. 7: Dedicated classification models vs. the generic classification model
very early in the session. The prototype operates by extending
the iptables/netfilter architecture. So it can be easily integrated
into existing Linux middleboxes. Our software is released3 in
open source for the community.
A. Prototype architecture
The proposed prototype operates in three levels; the first is
hardware level, where packets are sniffed using iptables rules
toward the kernel space (second level) and then the packets are
copied in the user defined space (third level) for multiplexing.
Hence, we divide the prototype into three modules; the packet
capture module, the reassembly module, and the machine
learning identification module.
Packet capture module: HTTPS packets are captured and
forwarded from the iptables queue to the user space (i.e.,
application level). We benefit from the libnetfilter queue4 to
gain access to HTTPS packets queued using iptables rules,
which forwards all input packets (from the remote HTTPS
service) and output packets (from the local web browser)
with port number 443 to the reassembly module to make a
copy, and re-inject them back to the network level to allow
the communication to continue. Then the arrived packets are
handled by the reassembly module.
The reassembly module: As explained before, we apply
the proposed approach in [10] to optimize the HTTPS flow
reassembly module. Taking into account that the monitoring
system needs to handle thousands of TCP flows, we use the
dictionary class to store the flows’ record. The dictionary is
accessed by a key that should be unique for each flow (i.e., the
4-tuples). Based on that, the TCP flow is presented as a list
of TCP packet objects, which are stored based on their arrival
order and can be accessed using the flow-key. Upon receiving
TCP packets from the netfilter queue, the system calculates
a hash key using the 4-tuple (source IP address, source port,
destination IP address, destination port). This key is used to
find the corresponding flow in the dictionary object.
Machine learning identification module: The identification
module has been implemented using the scikit-learn [31]. The
module’s tasks are: to extract features (given in Section III-A)
for a given HTTPS flow reconstructed by the reassembly
module, and to run the pre-built model to predict the service.
3https://gitlab.inria.fr/swazen/HTTPSFirewall
4https://github.com/chifflier/nfqueue-bindings
B. Performance evaluation
The evaluation environment consists of a client machine
configured to automatically open HTTPS websites, while our
prototype runs on anther machine with 64-bit Intel Xeon
Processor@3.80GHz, 32GB memory and OS Linux-Mint 17.0.
First, we measure the amount of delay needed for identify-
ing HTTPS services in real-time using TLS handshake packets
and 9 application data packets (i.e., the worst case). This delay
must be short, so we do not alter the browsing experience of
users that access HTTPS websites through our identification
framework. There are two potential sources of delay: the
packet capture process using iptables and the machine learning
identification procedure (i.e., the features extraction and the
prediction phase). Concerning the first source of delay, as we
just make a copy of captured packets without any treatment,
we consider that this delay is negligible, and we only focus
on the second one. The results show that we have in average
2.02±0.86 ms delay to process a single HTTPS flow, from
the trigger of the flow reassembly to the final identification.
According to [32], using HTTPS instead of HTTP adds an
extra delay of 500 ms when using fibre links, while over 3G
mobile network the delay is up to 1.2 seconds (depending
on the RTT value). So the delay added by the framework is
negligible for users because it is several orders of magnitude
lower than the latency introduced by the protocol itself.
Second, to measure the identification accuracy of our ap-
proach we need to integrate the overhead delay of capturing
packets and reconstructing flows, to make it sure that the
training and testing will be done in the same conditions.
Unfortunately, the public dataset was not captured through
the framework and consequently this traffic cannot be used to
evaluate the early identification prototype but only the model
on which it is based (see Section IV-B). Indeed, TCP packets
were dumped from the NIC to the dump file with no further
delay. However in our prototype, TCP packets are captured
from the NIC to netfilter queue (i.e., iptable) then forwarded to
our framework for copy and re-injected back to the NIC. This
process adds a significant delay to the Inter-packets arrival
time which makes the features calculated for training and the
one for testing incomparable because of this bias.
A traffic collector has been built to collect traffic in the same
way of the identification prototype. For this new evaluation
focused on the prototype implementation, a smaller dataset is
used- top 100 HTTPS websites. The training was configured
9to use a threshold of 5 application data packets. The collected
dataset contains 109513 records related to 582 HTTPS ser-
vices. We use the cross-validation (k=10) and C4.5 to evaluate
the identification accuracy.
The results show that we have 95.96% of accuracy. This
higher accuracy compared to the evaluation framework in
section can be explained because the top 100 HTTPS services
are easier to differentiate than the top 1000 used to evaluate
the models: the more services, the higher the probability than
a couple of them show a similar signature. Regarding the flow
throughput, the proposed prototype is able to process at a rate
of 31874 flow/sec. This throughput is higher than the flow
throughput given in [11] (24997 flow/sec) because we need to
use a smaller number of packets per flow before starting the
identification process. Based on these results, the prototype
performs well with a low delay overhead and a high flow
throughput, and also delivers a good identification accuracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increasing usage of HTTPS undermines the effective-
ness of service-level monitoring approaches for a large part of
Internet traffic. In this paper, we tackled the early identification
of HTTPS services. We proposed a new machine learning-
based method which is able to identify HTTPS services with
a high accuracy by using statistical features on the TLS
handshake packets and a small number of application data
packets. The proposed approach was evaluated using our
public HTTPS dataset-built to solve the issue of a reference
HTTPS dataset. Extensive evaluation results show that we can
identify HTTPS services using the TLS handshake packets and
up to 9 application data packets for long flows, but 5 packets
is a better tradeoff to identify both short and long flows. As a
direct application of our results, we presented an identification
prototype to identify HTTPS service. Experimental tests show
that our approach has alow overhead delay of 2.02 msec and
high flow throughput 31874 fps. In future work, we will adapt
our approach to identify services over HTTP2.0.
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